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UNDERSTANDING THE ACTS OF ANOTHER:  
EDITH STEIN AND KONSTANTIN STANISLAVSKI 
 
1. Introduction  
In recent years there has been a growing interest in empathy in 
many disciplines, including philosophy, cognitive science, deve-
lopmental psychology, social neuroscience, anthropology, nursing, 
and primatology (Zahavi, Rochat 2015, p. 543). These disciplines 
have presented different approaches to our capacity for intersub-
jective understanding in general, but so far they have not yielded a 
commonly agreed-upon definition of what empathy is. Perspective 
taking, putting oneself into someone's situation, has traditionally 
been conceived of as a mechanism of empathy (Stueber 2008, 
2013).  
To put oneself into someone else's situation is something 
one can do in a purely imaginary way. One can also take a step 
further and engage one's entire body in this pursuit. Examples of 
this are children's symbolic plays. There is also the preoccupation 
of acting roles in plays, and similar media. In a recent article Gal-
lagher and Gallagher (2019) have pointed out how experience 
from acting and acting methodology, in the first hand as regards 
perspective taking and environment interaction, have bearing on 
theories about empathy and intersubjectivity within phenome-
nology and cognitive science.  
Empathy can also be viewed as a matter of perception, how 
we experience other individuals. This is an understanding that 
was forwarded by Edith Stein, in her thesis On the problem of em-
pathy, (Zum Problem der Einfühlung, Stein 1917), which has re-
mained an oft-cited reference among the literature on the subject.  
In this article, I will point to similarities and differences be-
tween Stein's and Stanislavski's views. An overall theme will be: is 
information we get from other persons' physical expressions of 
their feelings the royal road to our understanding of these, and to 
what extent is such information possible to separate from infor-
mation we get from environmental factors?  
Stanislavski’s widely influential findings within the area of 
actor training also imply a conception of how foreign minds be-
come accessible to us. Edith Stein has made a significant contribu-
tion to this issue within phenomenological philosophy and is still 
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today a frequently cited writer on the subject. My aim with com-
paring their basic views in this article is to contribute to bringing 
their findings, and also their respective fields, in closer contact 
with each other.  
Some writers, Stein and Lipps among them, use the word 
“empathy” to designate our capacity to understand others. Other 
writers I will refer to talk about this capacity without using this 
term. It is this capacity that stands at the center in this article, 
whether or not one uses the word “empathy” for it. Thus also, it is 
not necessary for my purpose here to mediate between different 
ways to define this term, or to provide my own definition of it.  
With this article, I join a debate going on within phenome-
nology and cognitive science about the nature of social under-
standing. As I will show, the opposition between Stein and Stanis-
lavski corresponds to an opposition among phenomenological 
philosophers who see our understanding of others as a matter of 
direct experience based on the other’s bodily presence, and, on 
the other hand, on the basis of the other’s interaction with his/her 
environment. In paragraph 6, I will refer to a similar opposition 
between Stein and Aron Gurwitsch whose idea about our under-
standing of others, as I will show, has striking similarities with 
experiences behind Stanislavski’s notion of the role’s “given cir-
cumstances”. 
There is a tendency within cognitive science today to include 
performative media in the discussion about the functioning of our 
understanding of others. One example is Gallese’s way to apply 
the theory of mirror neurons to studies of performance and film, 
an approach there will not be enough space to discuss in this ar-
ticle. Another writer among cognitive scientists who takes interest 
in theatre and acting is Shaun Gallagher. I will here refer to a re-
cent article by him, Acting oneself as another: An actor’s empathy 
for the character, co-written with Julia Gallagher. Like I do here, 
Gallagher and Gallagher start with an historical overview of the 
development of the concept of empathy, where they include the 
opposition between two basic views: the understanding of the 
other as a “form of perceptual intentionality”, a view advanced by 
Stein, among others, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the 
understanding of the other as based on the other’s contextualized 
situation. It is this opposition I will focus on in this article. Gal-
lagher’s and his co-writer’s description of acting as perspective 
taking is, as they also point out in their article, consistent with 
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Stanislavski’s notion of “the given circumstances” (Gallagher, Gal-
lagher 2019). For my sake I am more hesitant than they are to use 
the term “empathy” in an account of the actor’s work, given the 
aforementioned lack of a generally agreed upon definition of the 
term, and the misunderstandings that can ensue from this.   
A difference between Stein and Stanislavski lies in the fields 
of knowledge they address, philosophy in the one case, acting me-
thodology in the other. But it becomes apparent that Stein's quest 
for how the other is constituted for us and Stanislavski's for how 
the life of a role is constituted for the actor give rise to similar 
questions about the nature of intersubjectivity.  
 
2. Origins of the notion of empathy  
The interest in our capacity to understand others got a significant 
boost through the invention of the word ‘Einfühlung’ and the de-
bate it gave rise to. The word ´Einfühlung´ was introduced by the 
German Art Historian Robert Vischer in his 1872 dissertation 
Über das optische Formgefühl. In 1909 the psychologist Edward 
Titchener introduced the term ´Empathy´ as a translation of the 
German concept (Stueber 2013). Moritz Geiger describes the ori-
gin of the word Einfühlung in the following way: the idea of empa-
thy grew up from the metaphysical and aesthetical speculations of 
Romanticism. Later aesthetics became reorganized from a meta-
physical into a psychological discipline. The Munich philosopher 
and psychologist Theodor Lipps made a major contribution to 
giving the word ´empathy´ a wider application by extrapolating 
the idea of empathy from the aesthetical questions and underlin-
ing its importance for the wide field of the knowledge of external 
egos and external personalities. According to Lipps, the concept of 
Einfühlung must become a basic term within psychology and must 
be the basic concept within sociology (Geiger 1910/25, 19, Lipps 
1907, 713). The concept of ´Einfühlung´ attracted attention from 
German psychologists such as Hugo Münsterberg, Stephan Wita-
sek, Johannes Volkert, Benno Erdmann, Alexius Meinong, besides 
Moritz Geiger himself.  
A question that was hovering over this discussion was, as 
Dermot Moran puts it in terms borrowed from Husserl: «how do I 
constitute someone else as the alter ego, as another ego (Ich), with 
its own ´centre´ and ´pole´ (Ichpol) of psychic experiences, affec-
tions and performances? » (Moran 2004, 271). 
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This genealogy of the word Einfühlung, or empathy has bear-
ing on the discussion addressed in this article, in the first hand 
because Stein acknowledged the influence she took from Lipps’ 
understanding of the word, and because she inherited the idea 
about its content as being a matter of ´inner participation´ (Stein 
1917, 11), or as ´experience of foreign consciousness´ (ibid., 14), 
i.e. of inner proceedings, in the first hand.  
 
3. Signs and context in Lipps’ approach to Empathy 
(Einfühlung) 
Despite the fact that the word ´empathy` and the discussion about 
it was given an application also outside the field of aesthetics, ex-
amples from the arts were still recruited to explain the nature of 
this phenomenon. Thus, one of the important sources when it 
comes to the use of the word ´empathy´ is Lipps' article « Aesthe-
tische Einfühlung» (Lipps 1900), where the author discusses the 
expression of anger in a work of art.   I will in this section go a lit-
tle more in detail about Lipps’ conception of empathy, partly as it 
was highly influential on Stein’s, partly as it illustrates a problem 
about the relation between emotion and environment that is 
going to be central in this article.  
An example that occurs in the early debate about Einfühlung, 
and that Lipps also refers to, is a work of Michelangelo, the artist’s 
portrait of Moses, a sculpture displayed as a part of a funerary 
monument in the church San Pietro in Vincoli in Rome. According 
to Lipps' description, the prophet is portrayed with an expression 
of ´holy anger´ on his face. For Lipps, this anger is not just his own 
assumption when contemplating the sculpture, Lipps can really 
see the presence of it, its undisputable givenness as an object of 
his thinking (Lipps 1905, 489). And, according to Geiger's under-
standing of Lipps, when we see this expression on the face of Mos-
es, we live in this anger, it becomes really my experienced anger 
(Geiger 1910/25, 22). Moses' countenance exemplifies what Lipps 
calls ´signs´, or ´symbols´, which are physical expressions from 
which we can access others' emotions (Nowak 2011, 306, Lipps 
1907, 714). According to Lipps, these signs make the other resus-
citate in me anger that I have experienced in my own life (Lipps 
1900, 418). The way from the Einfühlung in daily life to the aes-
thetic Einfühlung is not long. Lipps names the expression that 
opens itself to the aesthetic understanding ´aesthetic reality´ 
(Lipps 1900, 425). 
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The empathy with the other is for Lipps a kind of inner imi-
tation. To illustrate this, Lipps describes how, in his view, we ex-
perience the movements of an acrobat.  By means of my inner imi-
tation of the acrobat’s movements, there is no separation between 
me and him, I experience myself as in him and in his place. There 
is a complete oneness in the experience. It is only when I reflect 
on this event that the separation between me and him takes place 
(Lipps 1903, 121 f.). Lipps insists that we really share the expe-
rience of the acrobats by physical signs like we do with the anger 
in a work of art (Geiger 1910/25, 2015, 21). 
Thus Lipps contends that physical expression of emotions is 
our principal source of information about others' minds.  
One question that could be raised against this view is 
whether we only react to sensuous expressions in others, and not 
also to their acts in what we assume to be the given context. Argu-
ably, ways to express emotion like anger could also be actions ra-
ther than physical expressions, e.g., leaving the room, refusing to 
join a company, or remaining speechless. It is not that Lipps fails 
to mention the circumstances where a ´sign´ or a ´symbol´ occurs. 
But he does this in passing before laying the primary emphasis on 
the physical expression and what he views as its content. In con-
nection with the example with the acrobat, Lipps writes that ex-
ternal movements have an inner side, and that this is the essential 
part of the story (Lipps 1903, 121). Total empathy (Einfühlung) 
takes place when, viewing the acrobat’s movements, I let go, im-
mediately and irresistibly, and when by means of empathy in the 
acrobat’s movements, I keep all my intention focused on these 
movements. In this way, the empathic relation between the spec-
tator and the acrobat is rather a matter of connection between 
two inner lives via signs (gestures) than of a shared understand-
ing of the perils surrounding the acrobat’s activity and the de-
mands these put on the performer. Similar examples can also be 
found in Stein.  
It turns out that an alternative interpretation of the situation 
where the physical expression occurs compels us to reconsider 
our interpretation of the latter accordingly. The example of Miche-
langelo's Moses can in fact serve as an illustration of this. The 
mere name of Moses, it could be argued, draws our attention to a 
story about a biblical figure, a prophet. According to one of these 
stories Moses receives the Tables of the Law from God on Mount 
Sinai, and on his return views his People worshipping an idol, 
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something that can justify Lipps’ impression of expressions of 
´holy anger´ on the prophet’s face. Moses’ anger comes in a situa-
tion, and the question could be raised whether we would even 
experience his facial expression on Michelangelo's monument as 
precisely anger were we ignorant of its narrative context, were we 
not presupposing that it was this event the artist intended to 
render, were we not already beforehand applying this particular 
explanation to the prophet's countenance on the portrait or were 
we incapable of taking a person's perspective when faced with a 
deceit. The importance of the narrative for the interpretation of 
the image becomes even more poignant, given the fact that we do 
not know with certainty that Michelangelo's portrait actually 
renders the prophet in this situation. Macmillan and Swales argue 
that details in the artwork rather suggest that this depicts another 
situation described in Exodus, not in 32:19 where Moses' wrath 
when viewing the worship of the Golden calf is accounted for, but 
rather in an episode described in 33:20 when, later on in the narr-
ative, Moses with two new, blank Tables meets God to renew the 
Covenant. On this interpretation, the prophet's countenance, ra-
ther than anger, expresses «joy, admiration, exultation, awe, dis-
may» (Macmillan, Swales 2003, 76). The example illustrates how 
an implied, complex assumption about the context underlies what 
Lipps qualifies as the interpretation of physical expressions of 
foreign emotional life, and how in reality physical expression and 
interpretation of the situation simultaneously and seamlessly in-
teract to form the understanding. Lipps believes himself to base 
his understanding of Moses' countenance on the physical expres-
sion alone while, in fact, grounding both his observation of this 
and his interpretation of it on his presumption about the narrative 
context.   
Similarly, as regards the other example, when we see the 
acrobats in action, do we really lay all our focus on their physical 
expressions? Do we not experience with equal immediacy the 
stark element of peril involved in their preoccupation, and do we 
even need any sensuous ´symbols´ to experience the suspense 
caused by this fact? Does not Lipps take the context for granted to 
the extent of overlooking it and its importance? – We will come 
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4. Edith Stein's empathic approach to foreign experiences 
In her dissertation from 1917, Stein sets out to investigate how 
empathy is differentiated as the perception of psychophysical in-
dividuals. She acknowledges important coincidences between 
Lipps’ conception of ´Einfühlung´ and her own (Stein 1917, 11). 
She agrees with him that empathy is a form of ´inner participa-
tion´ with the other (Stein 1917, 11 f.). She does not agree on the 
identity between the empathizer and his/her object, which she 
reads into Lipp’s example with the acrobat, neither does she agree 
with his contention that empathy is a matter of ´inner simulation´. 
She reiterates Lipp's example with the acrobat, and she writes:  
 
I am one with the acrobat and I go through his motions inwardly. But in 
this situation I can also step out of empathy and reflect on my ´real I`. 
Empathy is not a feeling of oneness. I am not one with the acrobat but 
only ´at` him. The acrobat's movements are not primordial to me. But it 
is in this non-primordiality that foreign primordiality becomes apparent. 
(Stein 1917, 17). 
 
The example with the acrobat used by both Lipps and Stein 
echoes a similar example in Adam Smith, a writer Stein also refers 
to. Smith writes about the reactions of the ´mob´ when attending a 
performance of a dancer on the slack rope, how they «writhe and 
twist and balance their own bodies, as they see him do and as they 
feel that they themselves must do if in this situation» (Smith, 3). 
Smith here stands out as a representative of the idea that our feel-
ings for others is grounded in our ability to put ourselves in the 
other’s situation. According to him this happens with the help of 
imagination, whereupon we project these feelings onto the other 
(Smith 1790, 2006, 3). For Stein this is not a way in which foreign 
experience is given. She calls it «a surrogate for empathy». Empa-
thy, she explains, is «the experience of foreign consciousness», a 
«non-primordial experience that announces a primordial one» 
(Stein 1917, 14).  
She criticizes Lipps for being «bound to» the phenomenon of 
expression (signs, symbols) without paying attention to the bear-
er of these phenomena. It is in this context she presents what to 
her is the basis for the empathic engagement, the acknowledge-
ment of the other as another ´I´ (Stein 1917, 41) with an own 
´lived body´ (Leib) and as being himself a ´zero point of orienta-
tion´ (Stein 1917, 69). In a similar vein, she also criticizes Scheler’s 
idea that we are placed in a world of psychic experience, a ´neutral 
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stream of experience´ that only gradually differentiates into indi-
vidual experience (Stein 1917, 30).  Instead, she stresses the indi-
vidual as the irreducible bearer of experience: «every experience 
is by nature an ´I´s experience that cannot be separated pheno-
menally from the ´I´ itself » (Stein 1917, 31).  
One could add to the differences between Stein and Lipps 
that she emphatically places phenomenological reduction as the 
departing point of her account. This approach is also the one that 
makes it possible for her to characterize Einfühlung as an expe-
riencing act ´sui generis´ (Stein 1917, 1, 10). 
Similar to Lipps, in the examples, Stein uses to illustrate how 
empathy works, she shows a tendency to look apart from the situ-
ations that are part of her descriptions of emotions that open 
themselves to empathy. In one passage she writes about empathy 
with a person who has lost his brother (Stein 1917, 4). Stein lays 
all her focus on the emotions experienced by this assumed person. 
But she does not pay further attention to the circumstances she 
attaches to him despite the fact that these are necessary for the 
example to make sense. Stein expressly separates empathy from 
considerations about the context, i.e. perspective taking. Thus she 
writes (Stein 1917, 14): «On the other hand, if, as in memory, we 
put ourselves in the place of the foreign ´I´ and suppress it while 
we surround ourselves with its situation […]» . The formulation 
suggests that, for her, the act of perspective taking entails the 
suppression of the person whose perspective one takes.   
For Stein as for Lipps, empathy is an ´inner participation´ in 
the foreign experience (Stein 1917, 11, 27, 38). In her «strictly 
defined sense», empathy is «the experience of foreign conscious-
ness» (Stein 1917, 14). For her as for Lipps empathy is something 
that must take place here and now, it presupposes the physical 
presence of its object.  
Like Lipps, Stein sees the presence of the other's body as the 
basis of empathy. But she makes this relation an object of a more 
in-depth analysis based on two fundamental aspects of the human 
body that are already present in the German language, the one of 
Leib, which means the inner, first person aspects of the body, or 
the lived body, and Körper that designates the outer aspects of 
this, the body as I see it in others, and partly also in myself as an 
aspect of my lived body. The other's body is ´seen in´:  
  
The living body in contrast with the physical body, is characterized by 
having fields of sensation, being located at the zero point of orientation 
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of the spatial world, moving voluntarily and being constructed of moving 
organs, being the field of expression of the experiences of its ´I´ and the 
instrument of the ´I´s ´will´ (Stein 1917, 63). 
 
 For Stein empathy resides first of all in the fact that I directly 
perceive the other's body as present to me, as a lived body, a Leib, 
like my own (Stein 1917, 4, 56 ff.). 
In this way, Stein stands out as a representative of what Za-
havi calls «the empathic approach that is characterized by its at-
tempt to specify the particular intentional character of empathy»  
(Zahavi 2001, 158).  
 
For Stein, the intentional character of empathy makes it a 
matter of ´first philosophy´, of our basic way to perceive the world 
(Stein 1917, 22).  
In a section of her unfinished autobiography, From the Life of 
a Jewish Family (Aus dem Leben einer Jüdischen Familie), where 
she treats her work on her dissertation, Stein makes the following 
remark: in this work, as well as in all that followed, her principal 
concern was always what she called «the constitution of the hu-
man person», «der Aufbau der menschlichen Person» (Stein 1933, 
248). Her emphasis on the central element of the body in its two 
aspects stands out as crucial in this regard.  
Thus also, it is not the concept of empathy as such that 
makes it interesting to compare Stein with Stanislavski. No equiv-
alent to this concept can be found in his writings. Rather, what 
unites the two writers is their aim, that of finding out how the 
other subject is constituted for us. 
I will here go on to discuss an experience Stanislavski drew 
from his practical work as an actor, and that became central to all 
his subsequent writings on the subject. It was about the relation-
ship between the actor and another person, given in the form of a 
role. 
 
5. Acting as perspective-taking 
Early on in his practical work as an actor Stanislavski's observed 
basic obscurity as concerns the relation between him as an actor 
and the role. While discussions about acting generally focus on 
how an actor goes on with the work on the role, Stanislavski's set 
out to go to the what, the root of the relation between actor and 
role, what it means to act, with what and for what an actor steps 
on the stage (Stanislavski 1938). Is acting based on a form of de-
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ception, or of self-deception an actor involves him/herself in, 
where he/she passes himself off as someone he/she is not? Is act-
ing a way to produce artificial signs for emotions that are not real-
ly felt? Is acting a form of imitation, and if so, imitation of whom? 
He realized that this obscurity as regards the elements of his 
preoccupation affected his work onstage in a negative way (Sta-
nislavski 1925, 254-261, Stanislavski 1938, 179). The solution he 
found was what he came to name the actor’s ´magic if´: an actor 
does not claim to be someone else. He does not have to persuade 
himself that the artefacts onstage are real. It suffices for him to 
say: «if everything around me were true, this is what I would do, 
this is how I would relate to this or that event». (Stanislavski 
1925, 261). «This is the basic question to be asked when trying to 
establish the reality of a dramatic situation», Benedetti writes in 
his Stanislavski & the Actor (Benedetti 1998, 154). The given cir-
cumstances have to be identified and as givens they function as 
real constraints on the actor’s work.  
On this approach, a role is a form of first-person embodied 
understanding of another person on the basis of this person's ac-
tions in successive situations, within a hypothetical context. The 
role is not a preconceived personality – Stanislavski increasingly 
prefers the word ´role´ to that of ´character´ – but is considered as 
emergent from actions in hypothetic situations.  
Implicitly, the basic relationship between the actor's ´I´ and 
the role in the ´if´-mode means viewing the role as in basic regards 
someone like the actor himself, i.e., as a foreign ´I´. A living person 
has a lived body, not only an external one. In the ´if´-mode the ac-
tor provides the role with a lived body by hypothetically bringing 
in his own. As a consequence of this, the actor also comes to inha-
bit the role's ´zero point of orientation´, to use Stein's wording. 
Thus also, there is a basic person-to-person relationship between 
the actor and the other, the role, but without any form of blurring 
of identities, ´identification´, as the actor's ´if´-relationship with 
the other expressly entails that they are not actually ´the same´. 
The actor takes the role's perspective. Being in the role's situation 
is to be in what Stanislavski calls the role's ´given circumstances´, 
i.e. the circumstances the actor can extract from the dramatic text: 
the locations where the roles find themselves, their personal rela-
tions, their antecedents, their social circumstances, and so forth. 
Stanislavski calls the ´given circumstances´ the ´corollary´ of the 
´if´ (Stanislavski 1938, 53). From a phenomenological point of 
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view, the ´given circumstances´ can look very much like the role's 
´world´ or ´life world´, such as this can be pieced together on the 
basis of information in the script.  
The role, the other, is never there in isolation but always in 
interplay with a context. And so is the actor in his work onstage, 
accordingly, and inextricably, to such extent that the interplay 
between actors in rehearsal could serve as an embodied analysis 
of the role’s interplay with his/her environment, a dynamic 
´analysis by means of action´, or ´analysis on the floor´ (Knebel 
1959). 
According to his findings, it is exactly this interaction be-
tween the figure, the actor/role, and the circumstances in the spe-
cified situations that makes it possible for the spectator to grasp 
the specific character of the role's emotional life. Stanislavski cau-
tions against playing human emotions ´in general´, i.e. unrelated 
to the situations constrained by the ´if´ (Stanislavski 2008, 56 ff).  
According to his experience of his and others' work as actors, 
when an actor plays only ´in general´, his actions are «empty, not 
experienced, they communicate nothing essential» (Stanislavski 
2008, 56). One should note here that the ‘given circumstances’ are 
givens, and that, as a consequence, they function as constraints on 
the actor’s imagination and scenic work.  
Thus also Stanislavski tries to divert the actor’s attention 
from the role's ´inner life´, from ´feelings´ and ´psychology´ toward 
the carrying out of physical actions in circumstances, as a natural 
way into the sphere of feelings (Toporkov 1979, 216). In his view, 
the ´inner life´ of the other/role manifests itself in his/her interac-
tion with the world, which also is the means by which it becomes 
accessible to others. Stanislavski found out that the actor's inte-
raction with the circumstances of the play was all that was needed 
for making the role materialize before the eyes of the audience. 
According to his experience, the audience’s attention benefited 
from this rigor: «direct communication with the object and 
through it, indirectly, with the audience» (Stanislavski 1938, 242, 
Stanislavski 1925). The ´given circumstances´ are not only a mat-
ter of the actor's subjective imagination, but, once they have been 
identified through joint analysis of the script, they are shared by 
all involved in the scenic work. Stanislavski treats the given cir-
cumstances as hypothetical givens. ´Logic´ is a recurrent notion in 
his description of the relationship between actor and circums-
tances (See e.g. Stanislavski 1938, 57, 171). The rationality in-
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volved in the actor's way to relate to the ´given circumstances´ 
should be auxiliary to a basic emotional understanding (Stanis-
lavski 1957, 107). This ´if´-relationship stands out as something 
the actor should work on, not only in the scenic performance but 
in the entire period of preparation, rehearsals and performances.  
For Stanislavski the approach based on ´given circums-
tances´ was supportive of his basic endorsement of scenic realism. 
But Stanislavski has also been hugely influential on acting modes 
that differ considerably from the one of his own preference. Thea-
tre artists that have been influenced by him include leading fig-
ures in modernist and post-modern theatre, such as Vakhtangov, 
Grotowski, Boal, and, today, Anatolij Vassiliev and Kathie Mitchell. 
Stanislavski's writings in this field can serve as a major treatise on 
the subjunctive element in the actor's work, acting as perspective 
taking (McConachie 2013, 15, 22). One can find observances of 
this element in acting documented in writings early on in Western 
theatre history (Di Somi 1565, 268, Sainte Albine, 1747, 232). Act-
ing as bodily subjunctivity, as perspective taking in the ´if´-mode, 
transcends epochal and stylistic variations, as well as different 
aesthetical orientations, and thus also the confines of Stanislavs-
ki’s realism.  
In the same period as Stein submitted her dissertation in 
Freiburg, in which she set out to answer the question how the 
human person constitutes itself for us, Stanislavski was preoccu-
pied with a similar problem related to the actor's work, and which 
he formulated as a quest for «the life of the character» (Stanis-
lavski 1957, 145), or « the life of the human spirit» (Stanislavski 
1938, 157). Obviously, the life Stanislavski talks about here is a 
human life, which makes his quest concern the constitution of a 
human person, not as based on mere presence but as someone 
involved in a ´world´. If we see Stanislavski's approach to the role 
from the departing point of the ´if´ as a model for understanding 
another individual, this is in agreement with Stein in the sense 
that it implies an understanding of the other as another ´I´. It pre-
supposes a view of the other as a ´lived body like my own´, which 
is also in accord with Stein. What on the other hand differs Stanis-
lavski's way to create a ´life´ from Stein's ´constitution of the hu-
man person´ is the fundamental importance he accords to contex-
tual factors as a result of the ´if´ approach.  
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6. Gurwitsch and Schütz on our understanding of others 
The difference between Stein and Stanislavski consists in the first 
hand in the fact that Stein sees our understanding of the other as 
fundamentally based on becoming perceptually aware of the oth-
er’s affective states, while Stanislavski implicitly puts great em-
phasis on situatedness i.e. on how the other interacts with his/her 
environment. At the beginning of this article, I cited a contribution 
made to this discussion within phenomenologically informed cog-
nitive science by Shaun Gallagher in Gallagher and Gallagher 
2019, with reference to Stanislavski, among others. In an article 
entiteled Phenomenology of the we: Stein, Walther, Gurwitsch, Za-
havi and Salice (2016) have also pointed to the contribution Aron 
Gurwitsch has made to this debate, and which is of interest here 
because of striking similarities between his ideas and Stanislavs-
ki’s findings behind his concept of the “given circumstances”. On 
the other hand, Stanislavski’s complex conception of how we un-
derstand others does not only boil down to a simple opposition of 
this kind. In order to provide a more nuanced image I bring in 
another writer referred to by Zahavi and Salice in their article, 
Alfred Schütz, to help mediate between the positions.  
In his Human encounters in the social world, one of Stein’s 
critics, Aron Gurwitsch, criticizes the idea that we can access other 
persons' mind via something physical (Gurwitsch, 1979, 29). Cog-
nition of others based on perception of something physical, he 
argues, can only yield propositions on something physical. The 
mental states of others are never immediately given to me (Gur-
witsch, 1979, 29). According to Gurwitsch, Lipps shares with phi-
losophers like Scheler and Cassirer a one-sidedness consisting in 
the claim that only a single realm of phenomena (expressive phe-
nomena, like Lipp's symbols, my remark) is given which is of sig-
nificance for knowledge about the mental life of someone else. He 
argues that « Prior to all specific cognition, and independent of it, 
we are concerned with other people in our ´natural living´ of daily 
life; we encounter them in the world in which our daily life occurs 
» (Ibid., 35). « The other», he goes on to write, «belongs to the spe-
cific situation, determined by it, and, on his side, also determining 
it, so that our comportment toward the other is codetermined by 
our entire situational comportment» (Ibid, 36. In this context 
Gurwitsch also refers to Heidegger's concept of ´natural Dasein´.) 
And he goes on to write: 
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To be ‘naturally’ in the world signifies to stand over against objects, to be 
busied with objects and themes, to have thematic consciousness of objects, 
to be thematizingly directed toward objects (Ibid., 41. Emphasis in the 
original). 
 
Gurwitsch gives an image of this situational relationship between 
persons by referring to two workers cobbling a street: one worker 
lays the stones while the other knocks them into place. This rela-
tion, Gurwitsch argues, makes up the meaning of the fellow work-
ers. In conclusion, the meaning of the intersubjective situation is 
constituted by the correlated situated acts of the actors. Gurwitsch 
calls this ´role encounters´ and specifies this concept in the follow-
ing way:  
 
Our relationship to one another is a founded relationship insofar as it 
has its root in the situation mentioned. In other words: the situation pre-
scribes a role to us which we take over as long as we are in the situation 
in question. That we exist in such a place in the role assigned us and as 
such and such a role is indeed everywhere the sense of the situational 
determinedness of our concrete being (Ibid. 107f). 
 
In this regard, by stressing the importance of the situation, of situ-
atedness, of situated acts, and of roles in these situations, Gur-
witsch's view seems to be very much in accord with Stanislavski's 
experience that the understanding of the other is based on the 
circumstances in which his/her actions unfold, and with which 
(s)he interacts. Gurwitsch's description of how roles emerge in 
life, «a role assigned to us as such and such a role» and as «the 
sense of the situational determinedness of our concrete being» 
bears striking resemblances with Stanislavski's description of the 
mechanisms behind how roles emerge as ´life´ onstage.  
But unlike Gurwitsch Stanislavski's ´if´-approach entails a 
commitment to the idea of the other as fundamentally someone 
like the actor him/herself. While a basic individual-to-individual 
aspect seems absent in Gurwitsch's account, it remains a consti-
tuting element in Stanislavski's ´if´-relationship to the role.  
A writer who moderates between the positions is Alfred 
Schütz. In his Phenomenonology of the Social World he aligns him-
self with Gurwitsch's idea about the importance of the social 
realm for the amount of experience one has of another person 
(Schütz 1972, 162). On the other hand, Schütz also puts great em-
phasis on the person-to-person relationship, which he describes 
as a ´Thou´-relationship. «First of all», he argues,  
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the Thou-orientation is the pure mode in which I am aware of another 
human being as a person. I am already Thou-oriented from the moment 
that I recognize an entity which I directly experience as a fellow man (as 
a Thou), attributing life and consciousness to him (Ibid.) 
 
 In this context, Schütz, like Stein, foregrounds the importance of 
the face-to-face encounter (Ibid. 163 f.), something an actor can-
not obtain with the role, and that Stanislavski in fact did not need 
for his version of the person-to-person relationship.  
Schütz argues that the ´knowledge´ we have of others is 
based on our own experiences, a view that is also in accord with 
Stein.  When stating that «everything I know about your conscious 
life is based on my own lived experiences» (Schütz, 106), Schütz is 




In this paper, I have compared ideas about the constitution of the 
other forwarded by Edith Stein in her On the Problem of Empathy 
with an idea about an understanding of the other implied in Sta-
nislavski's basic idea about the forming of a role. I have presented 
two approaches to how the other is constituted for us, the one 
based on physical signs of emotional reactions, the other on the 
subject's interaction with a specific situation, or rather, on physi-
cal expression as inextricably related to specific factors in the en-
vironment. I have pointed to difficulties in isolating the under-
standing of someone's physical expressions of emotions from an 
understanding of the situation in which they occur. 
I have illustrated this with references to Lipps, Stein, Gur-
witsch, and Schütz.  
To sum up Stanislavski's ´if´ approach in relation to Stein, 
Gurwitsch, and Schütz: 
Like Stein Stanislavski's ´if´- approach presupposes a per-
son-to-person relationship to the other. Unlike Stein it also em-
phasizes the importance of the context. 
Like Gurwitsch, Stanislavski with his ´if´-approach empha-
sizes the importance of the context. Unlike Gurwitsch Stanislavski 
also, to equal extent, stresses the importance of a person-to-
person relationship with the other. 
Like Schütz, Stanislavski with his ´if´-approach emphasizes 
the importance of the person-to-person relationship with the oth-
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er, under the presupposition that the role is an ´other´. Unlike 
Schütz he does not identify this relation with a face-to-face-
relationship. 
Stein's idea about the other takes the form of a subject's in-
ner made accessible to foreign understanding through embodied 
expression. In this regard, she holds on to an idea about our 
access to other minds that was also Lipps'.  
Stanislavski's ´if´ mode of acting does not presuppose a divi-
sion between understanding the other as another ´I´ and under-
standing the other as situated in the context of given circums-
tances. According to him, the two forms of understanding are in-
separable. One way to clarify Stanislavski’s point would be to go 
back to Lipps’ influential formulation of the problem about how 
we can understand foreign minds. For Lipps such understanding 
was, first of all, a matter of how inner life can be experienced by 
other inner life, while according to Stanislavski’s finds it is, first of 
all, a matter of understanding, in a jointly intellectual and emo-
tional way, human action in context.  
Stanislavski's description of the actor's work implicitly sug-
gests that face-to-face contact is not the only way to obtain a phys-
ical understanding of an other as an ´other I´. This can also be ob-
tained my means of an embodied subjunctive approach to the 
other.   
Out of the two explanations of how the other is constituted, 
the one that stresses here-and-now perceptible physical expres-
sions in the first hand, and the one that accords the primal impor-
tance to actions in context and world interaction, it is only the lat-
ter that can account for how we can reach an advanced under-
standing of an other whose face is unknown to us, who is not 
present here and now, and whose existence is even only fictional.  
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